Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario (Preliminary Report)
Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario (Preliminary Report)
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自适应网络防御场景的实证博弈论分析（初步报告）
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Achintya Prakash
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael P. Wellman;Achintya Prakash
我们研究了一种自适应网络防御方案，攻击者攻击目标服务器的能力随着探测而逐渐增加，防御者可以通过移动目标技术消除攻击者的进展。环境包括多种资源、相互依赖的偏好和不对称的隐身。通过结合系统的模拟策略空间与博弈论分析，我们确定了六个版本的这种环境的均衡。结果显示了战略结果如何随着环境条件的变化而发生质的变化，并证明了可靠的探测器探测在建立有效的攻击威慑方面的价值。
We investigate an adaptive cyber-defense scenario, where an attacker’s ability to compromise a targeted server increases progressively with probing, and the defender can erase attacker progress through a moving-target technique. The environment includes multiple resources, interdependent preferences, and asymmetric stealth. By combining systematic simulation over a strategy space with game-theoretic analysis, we identify equilibria for six versions of this environment. The results show how strategic outcomes vary qualitatively with environment conditions, and demonstrate the value of reliable probe detection in setting up an effective deterrent to attack.