Collateral and other Forms of Guarantee in Rural Credit Markets: Evidence from Eastern India
Collateral and other Forms of Guarantee in Rural Credit Markets: Evidence from Eastern India
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农村信贷市场中的抵押品和其他形式的担保：来自印度东部的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Sarap
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Sarap
本研究使用原始调查数据，从六个村庄在印度奥里萨邦，以确定和分析系统的保证普遍存在于非正规经济部门的市场与不同的社会经济条件。调查数据表明，放款人可利用的担保制度比理论文献中所设想的要复杂和多样得多。放债人透过各种保证制度，包括抵押品要求和个人关系，可以以微不足道的成本筛选和监察借款人，因此几乎没有任何拖欠风险。
This study uses original survey data from six villages in Orissa, India to identify and analyse the system of guarantee prevalent in informal sector markets with diverse socio-economic conditions. The survey data reveal that the system of guarantee available to the lenders is much more complex and diverse than assumed in the theoretical literature. The money lender, through a variety of guarantee systems including collateral requirement and personal relationship, is in a position to screen and monitor the borrowers with negligible cost so that there is hardly any risk of default.