What we see: Inattention and the capture of attention by meaning
What we see: Inattention and the capture of attention by meaning
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DOI：
10.1016/s1053-8100(02)00028-4
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发表时间：
2002-12-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Gay, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mack, A;Pappas, Z;Gay, R
注意力对于有意识地感知任何物体都是必要的。不注意的物体是看不见的。当我们从事一些吸引注意力的任务时，是什么吸引了我们的注意力？早期的研究表明，只有极少数刺激具有这种能力，因此在这些条件下可以可靠地检测到（例如，Mack Rock，1998; Moray，1959）。两个最可靠的是观察者自己的名字和一个快乐的脸图标，这似乎是凭借他们的意义吸引注意力。描述了三个实验，探讨这些刺激是否被检测到的条件下，迄今为止未经检查，这要么导致疏忽性失明或与感知失败与注意力的限制。所获得的证据表明，这些刺激有一个独特的能力，捕捉和扩展的条件下，这已被认为是极不可能的注意力的限制。(C)2002年由Elsevier Science（美国）出版。
Attention is necessary for the conscious perception of any object. Objects not attended to are not seen. What is it that captures attention when we are engaged in some attention-absorbing task? Earlier research has shown that there are only a very few stimuli which have this power and therefore are reliably detected under these conditions (for example, Mack Rock, 1998; Moray, 1959). The two most reliable are the observer's own name and a happy face icon which seem to capture attention by virtue of their meaning. Three experiments are described which explore whether these stimuli are detected under conditions, heretofore unexamined, which either cause inattentional blindness or are associated with a perceptual failure associated with the limits of attention. The evidence obtained indicates that these stimuli have a unique capacity to capture and extend the limits of attention under conditions in which this has been deemed highly unlikely. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science (USA).