Effective Premium Discrimination for Designing Cyber Insurance Policies with Rare Losses
Effective Premium Discrimination for Designing Cyber Insurance Policies with Rare Losses
复制标题
设计罕见损失的网络保险保单的有效保费歧视
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_16
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Liu, M.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Khalili, M.;Zhang, X.;Liu, M.
网络保险与其他类型的保险一样，是一种风险转移的方法，被保险人支付保费，以换取在发生损失时的保险。由于被保险人的风险降低和保险人方面的信息缺乏，被保险人通常倾向于降低其努力，导致更差的安全状态，这种常见现象被称为道德风险。为了减轻道德风险，一个广泛使用的概念是溢价歧视，即，代理人/被保险人付出较多努力支付较少保险费。然而，这取决于保险人评估被保险人所作努力的能力。在本文中，我们研究了两种方法的保费歧视，依赖于两种不同类型的评估：预筛选和后筛选。预先筛选发生在被保险人签订合同之前，可以在每个合同期开始时进行;这一过程的结果使保险人能够估计被保险人的风险，然后确定合同条款。事后筛选机制涉及至少两个合同期间，如果损失事件发生在第一个期间，第二个期间的保费会增加。先前的工作表明，事前筛选和事后筛选通常都能有效地减轻道德风险，增加被保险人的努力。然而，这项研究的分析表明，当损失事件很少发生时，结论变得更加微妙。具体来说，我们表明，后筛选是不是有效的，在所有罕见的损失，而预筛选可以是一个有效的方法，当代理人认为他们比保险公司更罕见，在这种情况下，预筛选提高代理人的努力水平和保险公司的利润。
Cyber insurance like other types of insurance is a method of risk transfer, where the insured pays a premium in exchange for coverage in the event of a loss. As a result of the reduced risk for the insured and the lack of information on the insurer’s side, the insured is generally inclined to lower its effort, leading to a worse state of security, a common phenomenon known as moral hazard. To mitigate moral hazard, a widely employed concept is premium discrimination, i.e., an agent/insured who exerts higher effort pays less premium. This, however, relies on the insurer’s ability to assess the effort exerted by the insured. In this paper, we study two methods of premium discrimination that rely on two different types of assessment: pre-screening and post-screening. Pre-screening occurs before the insured enters into a contract and can be done at the beginning of each contract period; the result of this process gives the insurer an estimated risk on the insured, which then determines the contract terms. The post-screening mechanism involves at least two contract periods whereby the second-period premium is increased if a loss event occurs during the first period.Prior work shows that both pre-screening and post-screening are generally effective in mitigating moral hazard and increasing the insured’s effort. The analysis in this study shows, however, that the conclusion becomes more nuanced when loss events are rare. Specifically, we show that post-screening is not effective at all with rare losses, while pre-screening can be an effective method when the agent perceives them as rarer than the insurer does; in this case pre-screening improves both the agent’s effort level and the insurer’s profit.
网络保险：用户异质性导致市场缺失
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
G. Schwartz;Nikhil Shetty;J. Walrand
通讯作者：
J. Walrand
网络投资和网络保险的三层博弈论决策框架
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
Decision and Game Theory for Security
影响因子：
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作者：
Deepak K. Tosh;Iman Vakilinia;S. Shetty;S. Sengupta;Charles A. Kamhoua;Laurent L. Njilla;K. Kwiat
通讯作者：
K. Kwiat