Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum
Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum
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民众投票不合作：期望、外国干预和 2015 年希腊救助公投
DOI：
10.1017/s0020818318000255
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
N. Konstantinidis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stefanie Walter;Elias Dinas;I. Jurado;N. Konstantinidis
摘要当全民公决未能批准新的国际协定或成功地推翻现有的国际协定时，不仅影响国内选民，而且对这些协定的其他当事方产生负面的溢出效应。我们探索选民如何应对这种战略环境。我们使用了2015年希腊纾困公投前一天进行的一项民意调查的原始调查数据，以调查外国对不合作公投结果可能做出的反应的预期如何影响投票行为，以及外国政策制定者可以在多大程度上影响这些预期。我们对希腊公投的分析表明，这种预期对投票行为产生了强大的影响：与那些认为公投结果会导致希腊与债权人重启谈判的人相比，期待不合作的公投结果将迫使希腊退出欧元区的选民更有可能进行合作投票。利用投票前发生的银行关闭事件，我们还表明，外国参与者发出的代价高昂的信号让选民对不合作投票的后果更加悲观，并大幅增加了合作投票的份额。
Abstract When popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, it not only affects domestic voters but also creates negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements. We explore how voters respond to this strategic environment. We use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 Greek bailout referendum—a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were particularly high—to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response to a noncooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. Our analysis of the Greek referendum shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a noncooperative referendum outcome would force Greece to leave the eurozone were substantially more likely to vote cooperatively than those believing that it would result in renewed negotiations with the country's creditors. Leveraging the bank closure that took place right before the vote, we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a noncooperative vote and substantially increased the share of cooperative votes.