Weakness of provably secure searchable encryption against frequency analysis
Weakness of provably secure searchable encryption against frequency analysis
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发表时间：
2012-10
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通讯作者：
T. Suga;T. Nishide;K. Sakurai
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作者：
T. Suga;T. Nishide;K. Sakurai
有一些加密方案称为可搜索加密方案。我们可以基于安全模型来证明这些方案的安全性。然而，我们在某些结构中面临频率分析的风险，因为这些方案对文件中每个单词的关键字及其本身进行加密。在这种攻击中，我们假设对手知道明文（即关键字）的频率分布，并且对手测量密文的频率并通过比较明文的频率来猜测明文。在这项工作中，我们将此攻击应用于现有的工作，并通过考虑确定性加密和概率加密之间的差异以及支持的搜索类型来评估可搜索加密对此攻击的抵抗力。
There are encryption schemes called searchable encryption schemes. We can prove the security of these schemes based on a security model. However, we face the risk of the frequency analysis in some constructions because these schemes encrypt the keywords per word in the file as well as itself. In this attack, we assume an adversary knows the frequency distribution of plaintexts (i.e., keywords), and an adversary measures the frequency of the ciphertext and guesses the plaintext by comparing the frequency of the plaintext with it. In this work, we apply this attack to the existing works and evaluate the resistance of the searchable encryption to this attack by considering the difference between the deterministic encryption and the probabilistic encryption, and the supported types of searches.