Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations
Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations
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赎回前的恢复：主权债务重新谈判的延迟理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mark L. J. Wright
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Benjamin;Mark L. J. Wright
重组主权债务的谈判旷日持久，平均需要近8年时间才能完成。在本文中，我们构建了一个新的数据库（最广泛的同类涵盖90个最近的主权违约），并用它来记录这些谈判也是ineffective在偿还债权人和减少债务负担的国家面临的。具体来说，我们发现债权人的平均损失约为40%，而债务人退出违约时的平均负债率比进入违约时更高。为了解释这一明显的巨大的谈判效率低下，我们提出了一个主权债务重新谈判的理论，在这个理论中，延迟产生于最初导致违约的同样的承诺问题。债务重组在结算时和未来都会为各方产生盈余。然而，债权人分享未来盈余的能力受到债务人不履行和解协议的风险的限制。因此，债务人和债权人发现，推迟重组直到未来违约风险较低才是私下的最佳选择，即使推迟意味着贸易中的一些收益仍未得到利用。我们表明，我们的理论的定量版本可以解释一些程式化的事实主权违约，以及新的事实债务重组，我们在本文中的文件。最后，我们认为，我们的研究结果揭示了在更广泛的背景下存在的讨价还价的延迟。
Negotiations to restructure sovereign debts are protracted, taking on average almost 8 years to complete. In this paper we construct a new database (the most extensive of its kind covering ninety recent sovereign defaults) and use it to document that these negotiations are also ineective in both repaying creditors and reducing the debt burden countries face. Specifically, we find that creditor losses average roughly 40 per-cent, and that the average debtor exits default more highly indebted than when they entered default. To explain this apparent large ineciency in negotiations, we present a theory of sovereign debt renegotiation in which delay arises from the same commitment problems that lead to default in the first place. A debt restructuring generates surplus for the parties at both the time of settlement and in the future. However, a creditor’s ability to share in the future surplus is limited by the risk that the debtor will default on the settlement agreement. Hence, the debtor and creditor find it privately optimal to delay restructuring until future default risk is low, even though delay means some gains from trade remain unexploited. We show that a quantitative version of our theory can account for a number of stylized facts about sovereign default, as well as the new facts about debt restructurings that we document in this paper. Finally, we argue that our findings shed light on the existence of delays in bargaining in a wider range of contexts.