Punishing and abstaining for public goods
Punishing and abstaining for public goods
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0507229103
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发表时间：
2006-01-10
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Sigmund, K
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brandt, H;Hauert, C;Sigmund, K
在相当大的非相关人类群体中，合作的进化为我们的理解带来了许多挑战。目前的研究强调了两个促进公共产品互动合作的因素，即对叛逃者的昂贵惩罚和放弃联合企业的选择。最近的一种建模方法表明，自给自足的选择是利他惩罚最终固定的催化剂。我们提出了一个替代的，更微观经济为基础的模型，产生一个不确定的结果，而不是。进化动力学可以导致惩罚和非惩罚合作者的纳什均衡，也可以导致没有惩罚者的振荡状态。
The evolution of cooperation within sizable groups of nonrelated humans offers many challenges for our understanding. Current research has highlighted two factors boosting cooperation in public goods interactions, namely, costly punishment of defectors and the option to abstain from the joint enterprise. A recent modeling approach has suggested that the autarkic option acts as a catalyzer for the ultimate fixation of altruistic punishment. We present an alternative, more microeconomically based model that yields a bistable outcome instead. Evolutionary dynamics can lead either to a Nash equilibrium of punishing and nonpunishing cooperators or to an oscillating state without punishers.