Consciousness and information integration
Consciousness and information integration
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DOI：
10.1007/s11229-020-02613-3
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发表时间：
2020-03-06
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Gatzia, Dimitria Electra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brogaard, Berit;Chomanski, Bartek;Gatzia, Dimitria Electra
整合信息理论认为信息整合对于意识来说是必要的和/或充分的。在本文中，我们重点关注三种最著名的信息集成理论：信息集成理论（IIT）、全局工作空间理论（GWT）和有人值守中级理论（AIR）。我们首先解释他们使用的每个理论和关键概念（例如信息、集成等）。然后我们认为，当前的证据表明信息的整合（如每种理论所指定的）对于意识来说既不是必要的也不是充分的。与 GWT 和 AIR 不同，IIT 认为意识体验对于意识来说既是必要的也是充分的。我们提供的经验证据表明，在没有特征集成的情况下会体验到简单的特征，并认为这挑战了 IIT 的必要性主张。此外，我们通过提供半忽视案例和非模态完成的证据来挑战 IIT 的充分性主张，表明内容可能被整合，但无法产生主观经验。此外，我们提供了额叶病变受试者的经验证据，这些受试者无法执行简单的指令（尽管看起来理解其含义），并认为它们与 GWT 不相容。最后，我们认为，经验证据表明，视觉失认症患者无法识别他们报告意识到的物体，这对 AIR 的必要性主张提出了挑战。
Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration, etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT's necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT's sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions (despite appearing to understand their meaning) and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR's necessity claim.