Capacity Investments in Supply Chains: Sharing the Gain Rather Than Sharing the Pain
Capacity Investments in Supply Chains: Sharing the Gain Rather Than Sharing the Pain
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.5.4.317.24881
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发表时间：
2003-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Brian Tomlin
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文献类型：
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作者：
Brian Tomlin
本文研究了供应链产能采购博弈中的价格契约问题。对于由制造商和供应商共同投资产能的两方供应链，我们证明了一类协调价格契约的存在性，它们可以任意分配供应链的利润。而且，当供应商的预留利润低于某一阈值时，制造商的最优契约是数量溢价的纯价格契约，即每单位的平均批发价格随着订单规模的增加而增加。我们证明了制造商更喜欢简单的分段线性数量溢价合同而不是线性合同，并通过数值证明了这种合同是高效的。我们将我们的结果扩展到分段线性价格表与供应商装配系统。我们还丰富了Cachon和Lariviere（2001）的自愿合规制度。在此基础上，我们证明了在完全信息情况下，企业承诺合同和期权合同等痛苦分担合同能够提高供应商的产能，这与Cachon和Lariviere的结论形成了对比。最后，我们研究了当制造商更喜欢单断点数量溢价而不是公司承诺时。
In this paper, we investigate price-only contracts in supply chain capacity procurement games. For a two-party supply chain, comprising a manufacturer and a supplier that both invest in capacity, we prove the existence of a class of coordinating price-only contracts that arbitrarily allocate the supply chain profit. Moreover, if the supplier's reservation profit is below a certain threshold, the manufacturer's optimal contract is a quantity-premium price-only schedule, that is, the average wholesale price per unit increases in the order size. We prove that the manufacturer prefers simple piecewise-linear quantity-premium contracts to linear contracts and show numerically that such contracts are highly efficient. We extend our results for piecewise-linear price schedules toN-supplier assembly systems. We also enrich the voluntary compliance regime of Cachon and Lariviere (2001). With this enrichment, we prove that share-the-pain contracts, such as firm commitment and options contracts, increase supplier capacity in the full information case, a result that contrasts with that of Cachon and Lariviere. Finally, we investigate when a manufacturer prefers single-breakpoint quantity premiums to firm commitments.