Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief
Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief
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DOI：
10.1037/a0035880
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发表时间：
2014-04-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Baumeister, Roy F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Clark, Cory J.;Luguri, Jamie B.;Baumeister, Roy F.
相信自由意志是一种普遍的现象，对亲社会行为和惩罚性判断有重要影响，但很少有研究调查为什么自由意志信仰如此普遍。通过使用实验、调查和档案数据以及对自由意志信仰的多种测量的5项研究，我们验证了这样一个假设，即促进自由意志信仰的一个关键因素是让他人对自己的错误行为承担道德责任的基本愿望。在研究1中，参与者在考虑不道德的行为后比考虑道德中立的行为更相信自由意志。研究2提供的证据表明，这种影响是由于惩罚性动机的增强。在一个实地实验（研究3）中，一个表面上真实的课堂作弊事件导致了自由意志信念的增加，同样是由于惩罚性动机的增强。在研究4中，阅读他人的不道德行为降低了反自由意志研究的感知价值，从而证明了间接衡量自由意志信念的效果。最后，研究5检验了实验室之外的这种关系，发现现实世界中不道德行为的流行（以犯罪和凶杀率衡量）预示着国家层面上的自由意志信仰。综上所述，这些结果为自由意志信仰的力量和流行提供了一个潜在的解释：它在让他人承担道德责任和促进合理惩罚社会有害成员方面具有功能。
Belief in free will is a pervasive phenomenon that has important consequences for prosocial actions and punitive judgments, but little research has investigated why free will beliefs are so widespread. Across 5 studies using experimental, survey, and archival data and multiple measures of free will belief, we tested the hypothesis that a key factor promoting belief in free will is a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors. In Study 1, participants reported greater belief in free will after considering an immoral action than a morally neutral one. Study 2 provided evidence that this effect was due to heightened punitive motivations. In a field experiment (Study 3), an ostensibly real classroom cheating incident led to increased free will beliefs, again due to heightened punitive motivations. In Study 4, reading about others' immoral behaviors reduced the perceived merit of anti-free-will research, thus demonstrating the effect with an indirect measure of free will belief. Finally, Study 5 examined this relationship outside the laboratory and found that the real-world prevalence of immoral behavior (as measured by crime and homicide rates) predicted free will belief on a country level. Taken together, these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society.