Binding hands as a strategy for economic reform: Government by commission
Binding hands as a strategy for economic reform: Government by commission
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束缚双手作为经济改革的战略：委员会政府
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Dyson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Dyson
本文探讨了束缚双手战略的作用，它作为约束和德国经济改革领导权力来源的矛盾用途，它的争议性，它如何嵌入德国政治的系统性特征，束缚战略和束缚遗产之间的矛盾心理，以及意想不到的后果的作用。在一个为否决参与者提供了巨大机会的政治体系中，有强大的系统性动机去寻求和使用外部纪律。然而，与欧洲化一样，委员会政府已被证明是一种非常不完善的控制国内政策进程的手段。它对德国经济改革产生了复杂的、不同的影响。这些影响是由经济政策中某些思想的结构性特权形成的；领导人在这方面进行谈判以及通过预先承诺（包括战略排序）寻找和利用机会提高改革可信度方面的技能；影响精英、公众和市场判断“捆绑之手”可信度的各种因素；以及政策活力的作用和意想不到的后果。*本文借鉴了作为纳菲尔德基金会资助的一部分进行的广泛访谈，以及在德国学术交流中心（DAAD）的支持下在柏林度过的一段时间内进行的档案工作。我要感谢纳菲尔德基金会和DAAD。
This article explores the role of the strategy of binding hands, its paradoxical use as both a constraint and as a source of leadership power over economic reform in Germany, its contested nature, how it is embedded in systemic characteristics of German politics, the ambivalence between binding in as strategy and binding in as legacy, and the role of unanticipated consequences. In a political system that offers great opportunities to veto players, there are powerful systemic incentives to seek out and use external discipline. However, like Europeanisation, government by commission has proved a very imperfect device for controlling domestic policy processes. It has had complex, differentiated effects on German economic reform. These effects are shaped by the structural privileging of certain ideas in economic policy; the skills of leaders in negotiating this context and seeking out and using opportunities to enhance the credibility of reform through pre-commitment, including strategic sequencing; the various factors that influence how credible binding hands is judged by elites, publics and markets; and the role of policy dynamism and unanticipated consequences. *This paper draws on extensive interviews conducted as part of a Nuffield Foundation grant and also archival work conducted during a period spent in Berlin with support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). My thanks are due both to the Nuffield Foundation and to DAAD.