Economic Shocks and Civil War
Economic Shocks and Civil War
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DOI：
10.1561/100.00008072
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发表时间：
2009-01-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Padro i Miquel, Gerard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chassang, Sylvain;Padro i Miquel, Gerard
本文回顾了人均收入与国内冲突之间的关系。我们首先记录的是，经验文献确定了两种不同的模式。首先，贫穷国家有更高的内战倾向。其次，当国家遭受负面收入冲击时，就会发生内战。在正式模型中，我们考察了非正式文献中经常提出的一种解释：贫穷国家之所以会发生内战，是因为战争的机会成本很小。我们发现，虽然这一解释未能解释第一种经验模式，但它为第二种模式提供了连贯的理论基础。然后，我们丰富了模型，以允许有关经济状况的私人不完全信息，并表明共同的恐惧加剧了负面收入冲击造成的问题。
This article revisits the relationship between income per capita and civil conflict. We begin by documenting that the empirical literature identifies two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negative income shocks. In a formal model we examine an explanation often suggested in the informal literature: civil wars occur in poor countries because the opportunity cost of fighting is small. We show that while this explanation fails to make sense of the first empirical pattern, it provides a coherent theoretical basis for the second. We then enrich the model to allow for private imperfect information about the state of the economy and show that mutual fears exacerbate the problem caused by negative income shocks.