Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure
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比较公司刑事责任：通过比较刑事诉讼程序探索独特的美国学说
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发表时间：
2008
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通讯作者：
Edward B. Diskant
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作者：
Edward B. Diskant
在美国，公司作为实体，可能会因个别董事、经理甚至低层员工所犯的罪行而受到刑事审判和定罪。从比较的角度来看，这种企业责任标志着美国相对独特。其他西方国家很少施加实体责任，而那些施加这种责任的国家也相对较少，而且受到的惩罚要轻得多。为什么美国——而且实际上只有美国——强制企业承担刑事责任的问题一直是学术界关注有限的话题。本说明试图通过比较法的棱镜来填补这一空白。本文以德国这个不规定企业刑事责任的国家为陪衬，认为美国的原则最好的解释不是通过刑事理论，而是通过刑事诉讼程序。美国的刑事诉讼程序给美国调查人员和检察官根除白领犯罪分子带来了独特的困难。但它也赋予了那些德国同行不知道的检察官权力。其中一项是威胁提起刑事起诉的权力，该权力允许检察官迫使美国公司合作，放弃律师与委托人之间的特权，并切断与接受调查的个别雇员的联系，从而便利对这些个别被告的起诉。本说明利用刑事诉讼程序的差异而不是刑事理论来解释独特的美国学说，最后提出如何最好地利用刑事诉讼方法来理解并可能改革批评者日益谴责的美国制度。作者。耶鲁大学法学院，法学博士，2008 年；耶鲁大学文学士2003 年。作者要感谢 James Whitman 教授启发了这个项目并对之前的草稿提供了广泛的反馈； Kate Stith 和 Steven Duke 教授对此项目和其他项目提供了宝贵的指导； Greg Diskant、Paul Hughes、Richard Re 和 Nicolas Thompson 对这个主题和之前的草稿提出了非常有帮助的评论。 DISKANT OP 10/14/2008 11:37:14 AM 比较企业刑事责任
In the United States, corporations—as entities—can be criminally tried and convicted for crimes committed by individual directors, managers, and even low-level employees. From a comparative perspective, such corporate liability marks the United States as relatively unique. Few other Western countries impose entity liability, and those that do impose such liability comparatively infrequently and under the threat of far less serious punishment. The question of why the United States—and the United States virtually alone—imposes corporate criminal liability has been the subject of limited scholarly attention. This Note seeks to fill that void through the prism of comparative law. Using Germany—a country that imposes no corporate criminal liability—as a foil, this Note argues that the American doctrine can best be explained not through criminal theory but rather through criminal procedure. American criminal procedure imposes unique difficulties on American investigators and prosecutors seeking to root out individual white-collar criminals. But it also imparts powers to those prosecutors that are unknown to their German counterparts. Among them is the power to threaten criminal indictment, one that allows prosecutors to force American corporations to cooperate, to waive the attorney-client privilege, and to cut ties to individual employees under investigation, thereby facilitating the prosecution of those individual defendants. Using differences in criminal procedure rather than criminal theory to explain the uniquely American doctrine, this Note concludes by suggesting how the criminal procedure approach can best be used to understand— and potentially to reform—an American system that critics increasingly decry as broken. author. Yale Law School, J.D. 2008; Yale College, B.A. 2003. The author wishes to thank Professor James Whitman for inspiring this project and providing extensive feedback on prior drafts; Professors Kate Stith and Steven Duke for their invaluable guidance on this and other projects; and Greg Diskant, Paul Hughes, Richard Re, and Nicolas Thompson for their very helpful comments on the topic and prior drafts. DISKANT OP 10/14/2008 11:37:14 AM comparative corporate criminal liability