Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement

Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement
复制标题

DOI:
10.1111/aepr.12035
复制
发表时间:
2013-12
期刊:
Institutions & Transition Economics: Macroeconomic Issues eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Megumi Naoi;S. Urata
Megumi Naoi;S. Urata
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Megumi Naoi;S. Urata

文献摘要

相似文献

国内政治在促进或制约政府参与自由贸易协定(FTA)的决定方面扮演了什么角色?本文试图通过关注日本在跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(TPP)问题上的国内政治来回答这个问题。特别是,我们会问,为什么反对TPP的社会群体比贸易理论所预测的要广泛得多。我们表明,通过精英阶层的说服和政策运动,尤其是强大的保护主义利益集团花费资源说服不确定的公众,可以形成一个更广泛的保护主义联盟。
What is the role of domestic politics in facilitating or constraining a government's decision to participate in free trade agreements (FTAs)? This paper seeks to answer this question by focusing on the domestic politics in Japan over the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). In particular, we ask why the opposition to the TPP encompasses a much broader segment of society than is predicted by trade theorems. We show that a broader protectionist coalition can emerge through persuasion and policy campaigns by the elites, in particular, powerful protectionist interests expending resources to persuade the uncertain public.