Dismantling Policy through Fiscal Constriction: Examining the Erosion in State Unemployment Insurance Finances
Dismantling Policy through Fiscal Constriction: Examining the Erosion in State Unemployment Insurance Finances
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通过财政紧缩废除政策：审视国家失业保险财政的侵蚀
DOI：
10.1086/672460
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Alexander Hertel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alexander Hertel
福利国家研究中的一个常见命题是，通过专用工资税资助的项目往往更持久。本文探讨了美国失业保险（UI）作为一个例外，这一命题。失业保险是一个自筹资金的社会保险方案，由于无法维持稳定的收入基础，其福利随着时间的推移而被取消。该研究首先考察了UI财政的长期下降，并得出结论，UI税收的变化与州财政的最大下降有关。然后，它探讨了为什么更多的国家没有进行改革，以加强UI财政，并发现更慷慨的UI福利的反对者一般成功地阻止了这种措施，从而限制UI财政和逐步削减福利。这些发现对那些寻求改善UI偿付能力的人以及更普遍的福利国家紧缩的研究具有影响。
A common proposition in welfare state research is that programs financed through dedicated payroll taxes tend to be more durable. This article examines American unemployment insurance (UI) as an exception to this proposition. UI is a self-financed social insurance program whose benefits have been dismantled over time because of an inability to maintain a constant revenue base. The study first examines the long-run decline in UI finances and concludes that changes in UI taxes are associated with the largest declines in state finances. It then examines why more states have not pursued reforms to strengthen UI finances and finds that opponents of more generous UI benefits have generally succeeded in preventing such measures, thus constricting UI finances and gradually retrenching benefits. These findings have implications for those seeking to improve UI solvency, as well as for the study of welfare state retrenchment more generally.