Defending Against Microphone-Based Attacks with Personalized Noise
Defending Against Microphone-Based Attacks with Personalized Noise
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DOI：
10.2478/popets-2021-0021
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发表时间：
2021-01
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yuchen Liu-;Ziyu Xiang;Eun Ji Seong;Apu Kapadia;D. Williamson
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文献类型：
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作者：
Yuchen Liu-;Ziyu Xiang;Eun Ji Seong;Apu Kapadia;D. Williamson
声控命令已经成为智能手机、家庭助理和可穿戴设备等流行设备的关键功能。为了方便起见，许多人将设备设置为“永远打开”，并使用“嘿Siri”、“好的谷歌”或“Alexa”等触发短语来收听用户的语音命令。然而，这些触发的误报通常会导致隐私侵犯，因为对话会在不经意间上传到云端。此外，可以记录个人对话的恶意软件仍然是对隐私的重大威胁。与摄像头不同的是，人们无法知道自己的麦克风是否真的关闭了，也无法对基于语音的攻击进行切实的防御。我们设想了一种通用的物理防御，它使用扬声器向设备的麦克风注入专门的混淆“胡言乱语噪音”，以防止自动和人为的攻击。我们提出了一个全面的研究，如何精心制作，个性化的“babble”噪声（“MyBabble”）可以有效地在中等信噪比，并可以提供一个可行的防御基于麦克风的窃听攻击。
Abstract Voice-activated commands have become a key feature of popular devices such as smartphones, home assistants, and wearables. For convenience, many people configure their devices to be ‘always on’ and listening for voice commands from the user using a trigger phrase such as “Hey Siri,” “Okay Google,” or “Alexa.” However, false positives for these triggers often result in privacy violations with conversations being inadvertently uploaded to the cloud. In addition, malware that can record one’s conversations remains a signifi-cant threat to privacy. Unlike with cameras, which people can physically obscure and be assured of their privacy, people do not have a way of knowing whether their microphone is indeed off and are left with no tangible defenses against voice based attacks. We envision a general-purpose physical defense that uses a speaker to inject specialized obfuscating ‘babble noise’ into the microphones of devices to protect against automated and human based attacks. We present a comprehensive study of how specially crafted, personalized ‘babble’ noise (‘MyBabble’) can be effective at moderate signal-to-noise ratios and can provide a viable defense against microphone based eavesdropping attacks.