Interrogating personhood and dementia.
Interrogating personhood and dementia.
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DOI：
10.1080/13607863.2015.1118012
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发表时间：
2016-08
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Gilleard C
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Higgs P;Gilleard C
目的：探讨人格的概念及其在痴呆症患者护理实践中的应用。 方法：我们概述了汤姆·基特伍德关于人格的工作，并将其与形而上学和道德哲学中的人格概念化联系起来。 结果：人格的哲学概念源远流长。形而上学传统考察构成人格的必要和充分的品质，如能动性、意识、同一性、理性和二阶自反性。不同的观点把人格看作是一个程度的问题，而不是一个上位的范畴。在道德哲学中，人格被视为适用于某些人或所有人的道德地位。 结论：鉴于该术语在形而上学和道德哲学中的多重含义，人格是一个相对无益的概念，无法作为制定痴呆症患者护理模式和标准的基础。我们建议，护理应该少关注模糊和抽象的术语，如人格，而不是专注于支持人们现有的能力，同时尽量减少他们的无能的有害后果。
Objectives: To interrogate the concept of personhood and its application to care practices for people with dementia. Method: We outline the work of Tom Kitwood on personhood and relate this to conceptualisations of personhood in metaphysics and in moral philosophy. Results: The philosophical concept of personhood has a long history. The metaphysical tradition examines the necessary and sufficient qualities that make up personhood such as agency, consciousness, identity, rationality and second-order reflexivity. Alternative viewpoints treat personhood as a matter of degree rather than as a superordinate category. Within moral philosophy personhood is treated as a moral status applicable to some or to all human beings. Conclusion: In the light of the multiple meanings attached to the term in both metaphysics and moral philosophy, personhood is a relatively unhelpful concept to act as the foundation for developing models and standards of care for people with dementia. Care, we suggest, should concentrate less on ambiguous and somewhat abstract terms such as personhood and focus instead on supporting people's existing capabilities, while minimising the harmful consequences of their incapacities.