Timing- and Termination-Sensitive Secure Information Flow: Exploring a New Approach
Timing- and Termination-Sensitive Secure Information Flow: Exploring a New Approach
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DOI：
10.1109/sp.2011.19
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发表时间：
2011-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Vineeth Kashyap;Ben Wiedermann;B. Hardekopf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Vineeth Kashyap;Ben Wiedermann;B. Hardekopf
安全信息流保证数据的保密性和完整性，防止攻击者获取秘密信息(保密性)或注入不可信的信息(完整性)。隐蔽通道可被用来破坏这些安全保证，例如，定时和终止通道可能有意或无意地通过基于秘密或不可信数据修改程序的定时或终止行为来违反这些保证。使用这些秘密渠道的攻击已被公布，并已知在实践中有效--随着防止非秘密渠道的技术变得越来越实用，秘密渠道可能会变得对攻击者更具吸引力。本文的目标是了解定时和终端敏感不干扰的微妙之处，探索实施不干扰保证的可能策略的空间，并形式化这些策略可以实施的确切保证。作为这一努力的结果，我们创建了一种新的战略，它提供了比现有工作更强有力的安全保障，并澄清了现有工作中关于可以提供哪些保障的主张。
Secure information flow guarantees the secrecy and integrity of data, preventing an attacker from learning secret information (secrecy) or injecting untrusted information (integrity). Covert channels can be used to subvert these security guarantees, for example, timing and termination channels can, either intentionally or inadvertently, violate these guarantees by modifying the timing or termination behavior of a program based on secret or untrusted data. Attacks using these covert channels have been published and are known to work in practiceâ as techniques to prevent non-covert channels are becoming increasingly practical, covert channels are likely to become even more attractive for attackers to exploit. The goal of this paper is to understand the subtleties of timing and termination-sensitive noninterference, explore the space of possible strategies for enforcing noninterference guarantees, and formalize the exact guarantees that these strategies can enforce. As a result of this effort we create a novel strategy that provides stronger security guarantees than existing work, and we clarify claims in existing work about what guarantees can be made.