Transitivity of Preferences

Transitivity of Preferences
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DOI:
10.1037/a0021150
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发表时间:
2011-01-01
影响因子:
5.4
通讯作者:
Davis-Stober, Clintin P.
Davis-Stober, Clintin P.
中科院分区:
心理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Regenwetter, Michel;Dana, Jason;Davis-Stober, Clintin P.

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偏好的传递性是当代大多数主要的理性、规定性和描述性决策模型所共有的基本原则。为了具有传递性偏好,一个人、一个群体或一个社会如果偏好选择选项x而不是y,偏好选择选项y而不是z,那么它必然偏好选择x而不是z。任何关于个别决策者违反传递性的实证性的主张都需要排除合理怀疑的证据。我们讨论了为什么目前缺乏明确的证据,以及如何澄清这个问题。与Tversky(1969)开创性的“偏好的不传递性”相反,我们重新考虑了他的数据以及其他20多项关于不传递人类或动物决策者的研究。我们挑战标准的可操作性的传递性偏好,并讨论普遍存在的方法学问题,在收集,建模和相关的经验数据的分析。例如,弱随机传递性的违背并不意味着偏好传递性的违背。在过去多学科工作的基础上,我们使用简约混合模型,其中允许的偏好状态的空间是(传递)严格线性顺序的家庭。我们发现,许多现有的研究,旨在引起不传递的选择的数据是一致的传递偏好。
Transitivity of preferences is a fundamental principle shared by most major contemporary rational, prescriptive, and descriptive models of decision making. To have transitive preferences, a person, group, or society that prefers choice option x to y and y to z must prefer x to z. Any claim of empirical violations of transitivity by individual decision makers requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. We discuss why unambiguous evidence is currently lacking and how to clarify the issue. In counterpoint to Tversky's (1969) seminal "Intransitivity of Preferences," we reconsider his data as well as those from more than 20 other studies of intransitive human or animal decision makers. We challenge the standard operationalizations of transitive preferences and discuss pervasive methodological problems in the collection, modeling, and analysis of relevant empirical data. For example, violations of weak stochastic transitivity do not imply violations of transitivity of preference. Building on past multidisciplinary work, we use parsimonious mixture models, where the space of permissible preference states is the family of (transitive) strict linear orders. We show that the data from many of the available studies designed to elicit intransitive choice are consistent with transitive preferences.