Investment Timing and Vertical Relationships
Investment Timing and Vertical Relationships
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投资时机和纵向关系
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Bruno Versaevel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. B. D. Villemeur;Richard Ruble;Bruno Versaevel
我们表明，垂直关系的标准分析直接转置到投资动态。因此，当一个公司承担一个项目需要一个外部供应商（例如，设备制造商）提供一个离散的投入，以满足不断增长但不确定的需求，如果供应商有市场力量，从行业的角度来看，投资发生得太晚了。企业决策中的扭曲可以用勒纳指数来描述。尽管存在潜在的投资选择，但更大的波动性可能导致两家公司的价值降低。我们研究了几种合同替代方案，以诱导有效的时机选择，一种新颖的垂直约束是上游在输入时出售看涨期权。我们还扩展了该模型，以允许下游的双寡头垄断。当下游企业进行抢占竞争时，上游企业将投入物以折扣价出售给第一个投资者，使得抢占竞争正好抵消了垂直扭曲，并且该领导者在最佳时间进行投资。这些结果是通过一个来自制药业的案例研究来说明的。
We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment dynamics. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g., an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing but uncertain demand, and if the supplier has market power, investment occurs too late from an industry standpoint. The distortion in firm decisions is characterized by a Lerner-type index. Despite the underlying investment option, greater volatility can result in a lower value for both firms. We examine several contractual alternatives to induce efficient timing, a novel vertical restraint being for the upstream to sell a call option on the input. We also extend the model to allow for downstream duopoly. When downstream firms are engaged in a preemption race, the upstream firm sells the input to the first investor at a discount such that the race to preempt exactly offsets the vertical distortion, and this leader invests at the optimal time. These results are illustrated with a case study drawn from the pharmaceutical industry.