Optimal Dynamic Matching
Optimal Dynamic Matching
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最优动态匹配
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2641670
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Leeat Yariv
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mariagiovanna Baccara;SangMok Lee;Leeat Yariv
我们研究一个动态的匹配环境中，个人到达顺序。在等待更厚的市场，允许更高质量的匹配和最小化代理人的等待成本之间存在权衡。最优机制将不一致对的数量累积到一个阈值，并立即以一种替代的方式匹配所有其他对。在自由裁量权设置，类似的协议enuminate在平衡，但预期的队列是低效的长。我们量化了集中化带来的福利收益，即使等待成本很低，这也是相当可观的。我们还评估了替代优先协议所产生的福利改善。
We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a trade‐off between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher‐quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by alternative priority protocols.