Competitive Promotional Strategies
Competitive Promotional Strategies
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DOI：
10.1086/296442
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发表时间：
1988
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Narasimhan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Narasimhan
本文分析了从事定价游戏的品牌的均衡定价策略。每个品牌都有一个垄断市场（忠实的消费者），并在一个称为品牌切换器的共同市场中与他人竞争。在双重垄断的情况下，这表明品牌切换者的行为表征了双向垄断者的均衡行为。本文重点介绍了两个关键的比较静态：即，折扣的深度远离“常规”高价和交易或交易频率的可能性。讨论这些属性如何随忠诚市场的规模和品牌转换人群的行为而变化。芝加哥大学版权1988。
This article analyzes the equilibrium-pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game. Each brand has a monopoly market (loyal consumers) and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers. In the case of a duopoly, it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists. This article focuses on two key comparative statics: namely , the depth of discounts away from a "regular" high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals. How these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed. Copyright 1988 by the University of Chicago.