Nucleus and shield: The evolution of social structure in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
Nucleus and shield: The evolution of social structure in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
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DOI：
10.2307/2096335
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发表时间：
1996-04-01
影响因子：
9.1
通讯作者：
Lomborg, B
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lomborg, B
社会科学理论的一个基本问题是，社会秩序能否在霍布斯的世界里进化。这个问题是通过基于微观的模拟来解决的，该模拟解释了宏观结果，并可以处理宏观层面对微观决策的后续影响。通过这种方式，该分析也为微观/宏观辩论中的可行还原论提供了论据。霍布斯的问题是由一个人工世界模拟出来的，这个世界由有限的理性、创新的个人组成，他们玩着许多迭代的囚徒困境。随着时间的推移，个人会改变他们的策略，以优化其他人的选择。这种简单的动态方法揭示了一种惊人的效率：即使存在大量的误解，合作也可以出现并持续下去。此外，合作的水平也很高——通常比以牙还牙要好得多。非强制性的合作是稳定的，因为它是由许多不同的策略组成的——有些是好的（在核心中），有些是更谨慎的（在防护罩中）——这使得任何竞争者都很难打败所有人。这种动态模式为多元社会提供了强有力的隐喻。
One of the basic questions of social science theory is whether social order can evolve in a Hobbesian world. This question is approached using a micro-based simulation that explains macro-outcomes and can handle the macrolevel's ensuing effects on micro-decisions. In this way, the analysis is also an argument for a viable reductionism in the micro/macro debate. The Hobbesian problem is simulated by an artificial world of boundedly rational, innovative individuals playing a multitude of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Over time, individuals change their strategies to optimize against everyone else's choices. This simple dynamic approach reveals a surprising efficiency: Even with substantial amounts of misunderstanding, cooperation can emerge and be sustained. Moreover the level of cooperation is high-generally much better than would be obtained using TIT FOR TAT The uncoerced cooperation that evolves is stable because it is composed of many different strategies-some nice (in the nucleus) and some more cautious (in a protective shield)-making it difficult for any contender to beat everyone. Such a dynamic model provides a powerful metaphor for a pluralistic society.