The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
复制标题
意识的认知作用
DOI：
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.001.0001
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Declan Smithies
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Declan Smithies
意识在我们的心理生活中扮演什么角色？本书认为，意识在解释我们如何获取知识以及关于我们自己和周围环境的认知上合理的信念方面发挥着至关重要的作用。根据这种观点，我们的精神生活不能保存在无意识的生物（僵尸）身上，因为它们的行为与我们一样。只有有意识的生物才有认知理由来形成关于世界的信念。僵尸无法了解世界的任何事情，因为它们没有认知上的理由去相信任何事情。根据这种观点，所有认知论证最终都取决于意识。本书借鉴了认识论和心灵哲学中的一系列考虑，为现象意识的认识作用建立了持续的论证。本书分为两部分，从相反的方向探讨认知论证理论。第一部分利用心灵哲学中关于意识在心理表征、知觉、认知和内省中的作用的思考，自下而上地进行论证。第二部分从认识论的一般原则出发，自上而下地论证认识论辩护的本质。这些相互强化的论点构成了现象意识认知作用统一理论的基础，该理论弥合了认识论和心灵哲学之间的鸿沟。
What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? This book argues that consciousness plays an essential role in explaining how we can acquire knowledge and epistemically justified belief about ourselves and our surroundings. On this view, our mental lives cannot be preserved in unconscious creatures—zombies—who behave just as we do. Only conscious creatures have epistemic justification to form beliefs about the world. Zombies cannot know anything about the world, since they have no epistemic justification to believe anything. On this view, all epistemic justification depends ultimately on consciousness. This book builds a sustained argument for the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, which draws on a range of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The book is divided into two parts, which approach the theory of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part I argues from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation, perception, cognition, and introspection. Part II argues from the top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between epistemology and the philosophy of mind.