Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
复制标题
销售合同的重新谈判
DOI：
10.2307/2171908
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Steven A. Matthews
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Steven A. Matthews
考虑到以后重新谈判而通过的合同可以采取简单的形式。在委托-代理模型中，如果在代理人选择离开后可能发生重新谈判，则委托人通过销售合同向代理人“出售项目”来防止不利的重新谈判。如果只有单例（单一方案）合同是可行的，均衡初始合同必须是一个销售合同，如果委托人的重新谈判地位将是内在的劣势，在这个意义上，（a）代理人将有讨价还价的权力;（B）委托人不会观察代理人的努力，（c）代理人有天赋，即一套丰富的可行的努力，利用合同的细微差别。更新必然会发生，并且它会产生（第二好的）有效分配。即使当多个（多方案）合同可用时，如果从菜单中选择一个方案需要任何成本，那么最终的合同是一个单一的，均衡重新谈判发生。如果指定菜单有任何复杂性成本，初始合同也必须是单件;如果代理人有天赋，它必然是销售合同。一个弱的前向归纳细化准则是用来获得这些结果。
Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton (single-scheme) contracts are feasible, the equilibrium initial contract must be a sales contract if the principal's renegotiation position will be inherently inferior in the sense that (a) the agent will have the bargianing power; (b) the principal will not observe the agent's effort, and (c) the agent has the talent, i.e. a rich set of feasible efforts, to exploint contractual nuances. Renegotiation necessarily occurs, and it yields (second-best) efficient allocations. Even when meny (multiple-scheme) contracts are available, if the selection of a scheme from a menu entails any cost, then the final contract is a singleton and equilibrium renegotiation occurs. If there is any complexity cost to specifying a menuy, the initional contract must also be a singleton; it is necessarily a sales contract if the agent has talent. A weak forward induction refinement criterion is used to obtain these results.