Evolution of strategies in the three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma game.
Evolution of strategies in the three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma game.
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三人迭代囚徒困境博弈策略的演化。
DOI：
10.1006/jtbi.1998.0780
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
T. Ikegami
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Matsushima;T. Ikegami
研究了一个三人迭代囚徒困境博弈。本模拟使用有限状态自动机的格模型。特别是，一个嘈杂的2 p和一个无噪声的3 p-IPD游戏之间的相似性进行了讨论。众所周知，由于噪声，针锋相对达特失去了其鲁棒性，并在无噪声IPD游戏中被更复杂的策略所取代。但在3 p-IPD博弈中，即使没有噪声，达特也会失去鲁棒性，并被更复杂的策略所取代。结果发现，在这两种情况下，类似的策略接管针锋相对达特。因此，我们注意到，噪音在两人博弈中的作用被三人博弈中的第三个参与者所取代。因此，在噪声2 p-和安静3 p- IPD博弈中，策略都是多样化的。它也被发现，在一个自动机形式的游戏策略可以被理解为防御和进攻的子结构的组合。认识到这些子结构，使我们能够研究机制的鲁棒性的战略的3 p-IPD游戏。
A three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma (3p-IPD) game is studied. The present simulation uses a lattice model of finite state automata. In particular, the similarity between a noisy 2p- and a noiseless 3p-IPD game is discussed. It is known that, due to the noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness and is taken over by more complex strategies in a noiseless IPD game. But in the 3p-IPD game, even without noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness and is also taken over by more complex strategies. It is found that similar strategies take over Tit for Tat in both situations. We thus remark that the role of noise in the two person game is replaced by the third player in the three-person game. As a result, the strategies diversify in both the noisy 2p- and the quiet 3p- IPD game. It is also found that game strategies in an automaton form can be understood as a combination of defensive and offensive substructures. A recognition of these substructures enables us to study the mechanism of robustness in the strategies of the 3p-IPD game.