Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises
Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises
复制标题
白芝浩还是救助？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00177.x
复制
发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Guillermo Rosas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Guillermo Rosas
对市场的政治干预可以采取几乎无穷无尽的形式。在20世纪后半叶，人们普遍认为政府应该减少其在经济中的作用。不过，这一趋势也有一些重要的变化。为了应对严重的银行危机，各国选择的政策在拯救破产银行（紧急救助）和强制关闭银行（白芝浩）之间存在巨大差异。救助往往被描述为“裙带资本主义”的结果，即财富从纳税人向银行家的倒退转移。然而，政府的政策选择可能会受到国内制度（政治制度和中央银行的权力）和国际约束（经济开放和国际金融机构的支持）的影响，也可能会受到在困难时期支持裙带盟友的政治承诺的影响。我测试这些参数拟合贝叶斯层次项目响应模型的政策制定，充分利用政府对银行危机的反应数据。
Political intervention into markets can take a nearly endless number of forms. During the latter part of the twentieth century, there was a widely shared sense that governments should decrease their role in the economy. Still, there were important variations in this trend. In response to onerous banking crises, countries chose policies that varied dramatically between rescuing insolvent banks (Bailout) and enforcing bank closures (Bagehot). Bailouts are often portrayed as regressive wealth transfers from taxpayers to bankers as the result of “crony capitalism.” However, government policy choice may be patterned as much by domestic institutions—political regime and central bank autonomy—and international constraints—economic openness and support from international financial institutions—as by political promises to stand by crony allies in hard times. I test these arguments by fitting a Bayesian hierarchical item response model of policy making that takes full advantage of data on government responses to banking crises.