The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy
The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy
复制标题
稳定的国际环境协议的设计：经济理论与政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
U. Wagner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
U. Wagner
国际环境协定通常致力于解决共同的财产资源困境。由于国家主权排除了外部强制执行，国际环境协议必须自我强制执行。博弈论模型解释了为什么通过环境外部性施加的奖励和惩罚通常不能强制充分合作。因此，环境条约纳入了加强参与激励的条款，例如转让、制裁和与国际政治中其他谈判议题的联系。此外，与市场和政府的互动以及谈判过程中采用的规则和程序影响国际环境协定的设计和效力。
International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self-enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.
影响因子：
7.8
作者：
PUTNAM, RD
通讯作者：
PUTNAM, RD
DOI：
10.2307/134972
发表时间：
1983-01-01
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
DASPREMONT, C;JACQUEMIN, A;WEYMARK, JA
通讯作者：
WEYMARK, JA