Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3386273
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发表时间：
2019-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jerry Anunrojwong;Krishnamurthy Iyer;David Lingenbrink
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文献类型：
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作者：
Jerry Anunrojwong;Krishnamurthy Iyer;David Lingenbrink
现实人类行为平台下信息设计的凸规划框架市场和服务通常与其用户相比具有额外的相关信息。信息设计研究平台如何利用这些信息的共享来影响用户行为并获得理想的结果。以往的研究都假设用户的行为是为了最大化他们的期望效用，但这一假设并不总是成立的现实。相反，人们往往表现出偏见和偏离预期效用最大化。在“说服有风险意识的代理人：几何方法”中，Anunrojwong，Iyer和Lingenbrink研究了具有“风险意识”的代理人的信息设计，这些代理人的效用函数可能非线性地依赖于他们的信念。他们提供了一个凸规划的方法来解决最佳的说服机制，并建立其结构特性在不同的设置。他们说明了他们的方法，在一个应用程序中，涉及到共享的等待时间信息的排队系统。总体而言，这项工作有助于在现实的人类行为模型下的信息设计的研究。
A Convex Programming Framework for Information Design Under Realistic Human Behavior Platform markets and services typically have additional relevant information in comparison with their users. Information design studies how the sharing of this information can be leveraged by the platform to influence user behavior and obtain desirable outcomes. Previous research has studied information design assuming that the users act to maximize their expected utility, but this assumption does not always hold in reality. Instead, people often exhibit biases and deviations from expected utility maximization. In “Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach,” Anunrojwong, Iyer, and Lingenbrink study information design with “risk-conscious” agents whose utility functions may depend nonlinearly on their beliefs. They provide a convex programming approach for solving for the optimal persuasion mechanism and establish their structural properties in different settings. They illustrate their approach in an application involving the sharing of waiting-time information in a queueing system. Overall, this work contributes to the study of information design under realistic models of human behavior.