Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing
Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing
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DOI：
10.1109/tvt.2014.2363842
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发表时间：
2015-09-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Shen, Xuemin (Sherman)
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wen, Yutian;Shi, Jinyu;Shen, Xuemin (Sherman)
最新的移动人群感知 (MCS) 范式支持广泛的移动应用。该范例的一个关键挑战是激励电话用户成为提供传感服务的工人。尽管已经提出了一些通用众包的理论激励机制，但如何将理论框架纳入实际的 MCS 系统仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。在本文中，我们提出了一种基于质量驱动拍卖（QDA）的激励机制。该机制专门用于 MCS 系统，其中工人的报酬是根据传感数据的质量而不是文献中采用的工作时间来确定的。我们从理论上证明了该机制是真实的、个体理性的、平台盈利的、社会福利最优的。此外，我们将激励机制融入到基于 Wi-Fi 指纹的室内定位系统中，以激励基于 MCS 的指纹采集。我们提出了一种概率模型来评估提交数据的可靠性，解决了数据可靠性的基本事实不可用的问题。我们实现并部署了室内定位系统来评估我们提出的激励机制并展示广泛的实验结果。
The recent paradigm of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) enables a broad range of mobile applications. A critical challenge for the paradigm is to incentivize phone users to be workers providing sensing services. While some theoretical incentive mechanisms for general-purpose crowdsourcing have been proposed, it is still an open issue as to how to incorporate the theoretical framework into the practical MCS system. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on a quality-driven auction (QDA). The mechanism is specifically for the MCS system, where the worker is paid off based on the quality of sensed data instead of working time, as adopted in the literature. We theoretically prove that the mechanism is truthful, individual rational, platform profitable, and social-welfare optimal. Moreover, we incorporate our incentive mechanism into a Wi-Fi fingerprint-based indoor localization system to incentivize the MCS-based fingerprint collection. We present a probabilistic model to evaluate the reliability of the submitted data, which resolves the issue that the ground truth for the data reliability is unavailable. We realize and deploy an indoor localization system to evaluate our proposed incentive mechanism and present extensive experimental results.