THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF BANKRUPTCY COSTS TO THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE
THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF BANKRUPTCY COSTS TO THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb04855.x
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发表时间：
1978-05
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
R. Haugen;Lemma W. Senbet
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Haugen;Lemma W. Senbet
大约20年前，莫迪利亚尼和米勒（MM）在他们的开创性论文中证明了在一个免税的世界里，资本结构与公司价值无关。他们后来的文章（1963）正确地解释了税收的影响，并证明债务融资通过相当于政府补贴的方式增加了公司的价值。最近的几项研究在较少限制的条件下重复了MM结果[Baron（1974），Stiglitz（1969，1974）等]。特别是，这些研究表明，MM论文是完整的，即使在存在一个积极的概率无成本破产。斯蒂格利茨（Stiglitz，1974）对此提供了更普遍的证明，他援引了一种无成本的金融中介，这种中介可以重组企业，从而改变其债务-股本比率。也就是说，只要能够建立一个无成本的金融中介来维持个人投资者面临的机会集，企业的价值就必须与资本结构无关。在这个框架下，斯蒂格利茨证明了无成本破产的有限概率对企业价值没有影响。虽然原始的MM结果可以在更一般的条件下得到，但在税收存在的情况下，他们的定理是麻烦的，因为它意味着几乎排除股权融资（或等价地，几乎无限的债务-股权比率）。然而，一些作者[例如，巴克斯特（1967），赫什莱弗（1970，第264页）]指出，破产成本可以为有限的最优资本结构的存在提供经济学依据，从而在MM定理和观察到的企业行为之间提供了一种调和。最近，其他人[Kraus和Litzenberger（1973），Scott（1976），Kim（1976）等]在他们的模型中正式引入了破产成本。这些作者声称，一个最优的，有限的债务权益比率可以存在，从破产成本的预期价值和税收节省与利息支付的扣除之间的权衡。从本质上讲，最佳达到时，现值的
IN THEIR PATHBREAKING PAPER some 20 years ago, Modigliani and Miller (MM) demonstrated the irrelevance of capital structure to the value of the firm in a taxless world. Their later article (1963) correctly accounts for the effect of taxes and proves that debt financing increases the value of the firm through what effectively amounts to a government subsidy. Several recent studies have replicated the MM results under less restrictive conditions [Baron (1974), Stiglitz (1969, 1974), etc.]. In particular, these studies have demonstrated that the MM thesis is intact even in the presence of a positive probability of costless bankruptcy. The more general proof of this is provided by Stiglitz (1974) who invokes a costless financial intermediary that can reconstitute the firm which alters its debt-equity ratio. That is, the value of the firm must be unrelated to capital structure so long as a costless financial intermediary can be established to maintain the opportunity set facing individual investors. Under this framework, Stiglitz proves that the finite probability of costless bankruptcy has no effect on the value of the firm. Although the original MM results can be obtained under more general conditions, their theorem in the presence of taxes is troublesome, since it implies the near exclusion of equity financing (or equivalently, a nearly infinite debt-equity ratio). However, a number of authors [e.g., Baxter (1967), Hirshleifer (1970, p. 264)] have noted that bankruptcy costs may provide an economic rationale for the existence of a finite, optimal capital structure, and hence provide a reconciliation between the MM theorem and observed firm behavior. More recently, others [Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Kim (1976), etc.] have formally introduced bankruptcy costs in their models. These authors claim that an optimal, finite debt-equity ratio can exist, resulting from a trade-off between the expected value of bankruptcy costs and the tax savings associated with the deductibility of interest payments. Essentially, the optimum is reached when the present value of the