Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
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DOI：
10.1086/261392
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发表时间：
1986-06
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
J. Laffont;J. Tirole
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Laffont;J. Tirole
本文强调了会计数据在管理或采购合同中的使用，当供应商（1）拥有关于项目成本的上级信息，（2）投资于降低成本。主要结果表明，在风险中性下，供应商宣布一个预期成本，并给出了一个激励合同线性成本超支。随着公布成本的降低，这种（最优）合同会向固定价格合同转变。然后介绍了一种投资选择，并研究了收益率调节的使用。
The paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier (1) has superior information about the cost of the project and (2) invests in cost reduction. The main result states that, under risk neutrality, the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns. This (optimal) contract moves toward a fixed-price contract as the announced cost decreases. An investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate-of-return regulation is studied.