When data contributors meet multiple crowdsourcers: Bilateral competition in mobile crowdsourcing
When data contributors meet multiple crowdsourcers: Bilateral competition in mobile crowdsourcing
复制标题
当数据贡献者遇到多个众包者：移动众包的双边竞争
DOI：
10.1016/j.comnet.2015.11.027
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
5.6
通讯作者：
Min-You Shu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jia Peng;Yanmin Zhu;Wei Shu;Min-You Shu
随着嵌入传感器的智能手机的使用越来越广泛，我们设想将有许多众包从大量智能手机贡献者那里获取传感数据。它们形成了一个双边竞争市场，众包商竞争有限的传感服务，智能手机贡献者竞争众包商的有限预算。每个众包都必须选择一个“最佳”预算，以吸引足够的智能手机贡献。每个智能手机贡献者必须决定加入的众包，而拥挤的众包可能会导致低奖励。为了实现众包和智能手机贡献者各自的目标，需要更好地理解这个双边竞争市场的基本理性和特征。在本文中，我们提出了这样一个双边竞争市场的博弈论研究。为了更实际，我们考虑智能手机贡献者的有限理性。我们制定的智能手机贡献者的动态行为作为一个进化的游戏，并提出了一个算法的进化过程的实施。为了模拟众包之间的竞争，我们使用了一个非合作博弈。我们证明了纳什均衡的存在性，并提出了一个迭代算法来实现纳什均衡。
With the increasingly wide use of sensor-embedded smartphones, we envision that there will be many crowdsourcers to acquire sensing data from a large population of smartphone contributors. They form a bilateral competition market, where crowdsourcers compete for the limited sensing service and smartphone contributors compete for the limited budget from crowdsourcers. Each crowdsourcer has to select an “optimal” budget that can attract enough smartphone contributions. Each smartphone contributor has to decide the crowdsourcers to join, while a congested crowdsourcer may result in a low reward. To achieve the respective goals of crowdsourcers and smartphone contributors, the underlying rational and characteristics in this bilateral competition market needs to be better understood. In this paper, we present a game theoretic study of such a bilateral competition market. To be more practical, we consider the bounded rationality of smartphone contributors. We formulate the dynamic behavior of smartphone contributors as an evolutionary game and present an algorithm for the implementation of evolution process. To model the competition among crowdsourcers, we use a non-cooperative game. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium and propose an iterative algorithm to achieve the Nash equilibrium.