Equilibria in Electricity and Natural Gas Markets With Strategic Offers and Bids
Equilibria in Electricity and Natural Gas Markets With Strategic Offers and Bids
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DOI：
10.1109/tpwrs.2019.2947646
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发表时间：
2020-05
影响因子：
6.6
通讯作者：
Sheng Chen;A. Conejo;R. Sioshansi;Zhi-nong Wei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sheng Chen;A. Conejo;R. Sioshansi;Zhi-nong Wei
我们研究的是参与电力和天然气市场的战略企业所实现的市场均衡。战略公司向两个市场提交报价和投标，目的是最大化利润或效用，我们考虑的公司可以包括电力和天然气供需的组合。这些公司的战略行动由上层问题表示，这些上层问题受到代表电力和天然气市场清算的共享下层问题的优化。这种市场结构和我们的建模方法产生了一个多领导者/两个追随者互补问题。我们开发了一种建模方法，可以找到具有不同特征的均衡，例如，最大化社会福利、生产者利润或消费者福利。我们证明了数字，生产者的目标通常是提高市场价格，而消费者寻求降低它们。
We study market equilibria that are achieved by strategic firms that participate in electricity and natural gas markets. Strategic firms submit their offers and bids to both markets with the aim of maximizing profit or utility and we consider firms that can include a combination of electricity and natural gas supply and demand. The strategic actions of these firms are represented by upper-level problems that are optimized subject to shared lower-level problems that represent the clearing of electricity and natural gas markets. This market structure and our modeling approach yields a multiple-leader/two-follower complementarity problem. We develop a modeling approach that can find equilibria with different characteristics, e.g., maximized social welfare, producer profits, or consumer welfare. We demonstrate numerically that producers aim typically to increase market prices while consumers seek to decrease them.