The Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties
The Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties
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标准必要专利和 FRAND 特许权使用费的比较法学和经济学
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发表时间：
2013
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通讯作者：
Thomas F. Cotter
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作者：
Thomas F. Cotter
标准制定组织通常要求其成员声明哪些专利对未来标准的实践至关重要，并同意以“公平、合理和非歧视”（FRAND）的条款许可任何此类标准必要专利（SEP）。在最近涉及FRAND担保的SEP的纠纷中出现的问题包括：（1）FRAND承诺是否为第三方的利益创造了一个有约束力的合同，使SEP所有人有义务放弃对SEP侵权寻求禁令救济的权利;（2）救济法，或其他普遍适用的民法原则，如“滥用权利原则，“可限制现行自雇人士取得禁制令济助的能力;（3）在何种情况下，竞争法（反托拉斯）可以在解决这些问题方面发挥作用;（4）专利权人是否有权以持续损害的形式获得救济，如果这些法律中的一个或多个机构消除了禁令的可能性;（5）如果是这样，法院应该如何计算这些损害赔偿。本文概述了美国和其他地方的法院和其他实体如何开始解决这些问题，并分析了不同可能方法的优缺点。我认为，除其他事项外，第一，法院一般不应该允许SEP所有者获得禁令，而只是持续的损害赔偿;第二，在原则上，虽然在实践中可能并不总是，它是最好的使用合同和专利法来实现这一结果，而不是反托拉斯;第三，在对侵犯SEPs的行为给予金钱救济时，法院应采用与一般计算合理特许权使用费相同的方法，做了一些修改
Standard setting organizations often require their members to declare which of their patents are essential to the practice of a prospective standard, and to agree to license any such standard-essential patents (SEPs) on "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND) terms. Among the issues that have arisen in recent disputes involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs are (1) whether a FRAND commitment creates a binding contract for the benefit of third parties, obligating the SEP owner to forgo the right to seek injunctive relief for the infringement of the SEP; (2) whether the law of remedies, or other principles of generally applicable civil law such as the doctrine of "abuse of right," can limit the prevailing SEP owner’s ability to obtain injunctive relief; (3) the circustances under which competition law (antitrust) may play a role in resolving these matters; (4) whether the patentee is entitled to relief in the form of ongoing damages, if one or more of these bodies of law eliminates the possibility of an injunction; and (5) if so, how should courts calculate those damages. This article provides both an overview of how courts and other entities have begun to address these questions in the United States and elsewhere, and my analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of different possible approaches. I argue, among other things, first that courts generally should not allow SEP owners to obtain injunctions, but rather only ongoing damages; second, that in principle though perhaps not always in practice, it is preferable to use contract and patent law to achieve this result, as opposed to antitrust; and third, that in awarding monetary relief for the infringement of SEPs courts should apply the same methodology the use to calculate reasonable royalties generally, subject to a few modifications.