Collective decision making by rational individuals
Collective decision making by rational individuals
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1811964115
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发表时间：
2018-10-30
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Mann, Richard P.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mann, Richard P.
人类和动物集体决策的模式和机制吸引了经验和理论的关注。特别令人感兴趣的是社会反馈规则的多样性，以及这些行为规则在多大程度上可以从理性估计和决策理论中得到解释和预测。然而，旨在模拟全方位社会信息使用的模型已经纳入了对理性决策理论的特别偏离，以解释行为的明显随机性和可变性。在本文中，我开发了一个模型的社会信息的使用和集体决策的完全理性的代理人，揭示了如何出现广泛的明显随机的社会决策规则从基本的信息不对称的个人之间和决策者和观察者之间的决定。除了表明理性决策与集体行为的经验观察是一致的之外，这个模型还对个体如何在群体中做出决策做出了几个可检验的预测，并为我们如何看待动物和人类行为的可变性来源提供了一个有价值的视角。
The patterns and mechanisms of collective decision making in humans and animals have attracted both empirical and theoretical attention. Of particular interest has been the variety of social feedback rules and the extent to which these behavioral rules can be explained and predicted from theories of rational estimation and decision making. However, models that aim to model the full range of social information use have incorporated ad hoc departures from rational decision-making theory to explain the apparent stochasticity and variability of behavior. In this paper I develop a model of social information use and collective decision making by fully rational agents that reveals how a wide range of apparently stochastic social decision rules emerge from fundamental information asymmetries both between individuals and between the decision makers and the observer of those decisions. As well as showing that rational decision making is consistent with empirical observations of collective behavior, this model makes several testable predictions about how individuals make decisions in groups and offers a valuable perspective on how we view sources of variability in animal, and human, behavior.