Public Bads, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and the Value of Information
Public Bads, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and the Value of Information
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发表时间：
2014-03
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通讯作者：
H. Sakamoto
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作者：
H. Sakamoto
本文建立了一个简单的公共坏事模型，其中玩家对他们的集体行动的后果有不同的信念。平衡的属性及其与信念和偏好的关系进行了研究，然后详细调查新信息的影响。我们的分析揭示了一个重要的权衡与信息政策的信念异质性和模糊性的存在。特别是，我们表明，新的可用信息可以明确恶化搭便车的问题，即使它更好地反映了正确的风险比球员的信念。如果参与者对自己的信念同样有信心，增加信息噪音永远不会减轻问题的公共不良性质。然而，当信念高度异质时，一定量的信息噪声可以是帕累托改进的，风险和模糊厌恶程度在其中扮演着不对称的角色。
This paper develops a simple model of public bads where players have heterogeneous beliefs about the consequence of their collective action. Properties of equilibrium and its relation to beliefs and preference are examined, followed by a detailed investigation of the impacts of new information. Our analysis sheds light on an important trade-off associated with information policies in the presence of belief heterogeneity and ambiguity. In particular, we show that newly available information can unambiguously worsen the free-riding problem even when it better reflects the correct risk than the players’ beliefs. Adding information noise will never mitigate the public-bad nature of the problem if players are equally confident about their beliefs. When the beliefs are highly heterogeneous, however, a certain amount of information noise can be Pareto-improving, for which the degrees of risk and ambiguity aversion play asymmetric roles.