Quantifying location privacy in permissioned blockchain-based internet of things (IoT)

Quantifying location privacy in permissioned blockchain-based internet of things (IoT)
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DOI:
10.1145/3360774.3360800
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发表时间:
2019-11
期刊:
Proceedings of the 16th EAI International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking and Services
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
A. Shahid;N. Pissinou;Laurent L. Njilla;Sheila Alemany;Ahmed Imteaj;K. Makki;Edwin Aguilar
A. Shahid;N. Pissinou;Laurent L. Njilla;Sheila Alemany;Ahmed Imteaj;K. Makki;Edwin Aguilar
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Shahid;N. Pissinou;Laurent L. Njilla;Sheila Alemany;Ahmed Imteaj;K. Makki;Edwin Aguilar

文献摘要

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最近,区块链受到了以移动为中心的物联网(IoT)的广泛关注。在基于移动的设备的对等网络(P2P)中,通过设计来保证信息的内在完整性和不变性的安全性是关键。在许可的区块链中,系统的权威控制着其用户的身份。这些信息可以允许恶意的权威机构将身份与他们的时空数据进行映射,这破坏了移动的用户的位置隐私。在本文中,我们研究了三种条件下基于许可区块链的物联网系统中的位置隐私保护问题。首先,区块链的权威机构持有系统中的公钥和私钥分发任务。其次,连续的基于位置的事务之间存在时空相关性。第三,用户通过短距离通信技术彼此通信,使得其构成关于其实际位置的位置证明(PoL)。我们表明,在具有权威和PoL存在的许可区块链中,现有方法无法使用即插即用方法来保护位置隐私。在这种情况下,我们提出了BlockPriv,这是一种模糊技术,它在理论和实验上量化了隐私和效用之间的关系,以便动态地保护许可区块链中敏感位置的隐私。
Recently, blockchain has received much attention from the mobility-centric Internet of Things (IoT). It is deemed the key to ensuring the built-in integrity of information and security of immutability by design in the peer-to-peer network (P2P) of mobile devices. In a permissioned blockchain, the authority of the system has control over the identities of its users. Such information can allow an ill-intentioned authority to map identities with their spatiotemporal data, which undermines the location privacy of a mobile user. In this paper, we study the location privacy preservation problem in the context of permissioned blockchain-based IoT systems under three conditions. First, the authority of the blockchain holds the public and private key distribution task in the system. Second, there exists a spatiotemporal correlation between consecutive location-based transactions. Third, users communicate with each other through short-range communication technologies such that it constitutes a proof of location (PoL) on their actual locations. We show that, in a permissioned blockchain with an authority and a presence of a PoL, existing approaches cannot be applied using a plug-and-play approach to protect location privacy. In this context, we propose BlockPriv, an obfuscation technique that quantifies, both theoretically and experimentally, the relationship between privacy and utility in order to dynamically protect the privacy of sensitive locations in the permissioned blockchain.