Limits on Introspection: Distorted Subjective Time During the Dual-Task Bottleneck
Limits on Introspection: Distorted Subjective Time During the Dual-Task Bottleneck
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02211.x
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发表时间：
2008-11-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Sigman, Mariano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Corallo, Guido;Sackur, Jerome;Sigman, Mariano
哪些认知过程可以被有意识的报告所触及？为了研究有意识可报告性的局限性，我们设计了一种新的量化内省方法，在该方法中，受试者在每次标准认知任务的试验后被要求估计完成任务所花费的时间。然后，我们应用经典的心理测时技术，如附加因素法，分析这些内省估计的反应时间。我们证明，内省的反应时间可以是一个敏感的措施，密切相关的客观反应时间在一个单一的任务背景。然而，在心理不应期任务中，由第二个并发任务的干扰导致的客观加工延迟完全不存在于内省估计中。这些结果表明，内省估计花费在一项任务上的时间与中央处理资源的可用性期间密切相关。
Which cognitive processes are accessible to conscious report? To study the limits of conscious reportability, we designed a novel method of quantified introspection, in which subjects were asked, after each trial of a standard cognitive task, to estimate the time spent completing the task. We then applied classical mental-chronometry techniques, such as the additive-factors method, to analyze these introspective estimates of response time. We demonstrate that introspective response time can be a sensitive measure, tightly correlated with objective response time in a single-task context. In a psychological-refractory-period task, however, the objective processing delay resulting from interference by a second concurrent task is totally absent from introspective estimates. These results suggest that introspective estimates of time spent on a task tightly correlate with the period of availability of central processing resources.