Piece rates, fixed wages, and incentive effects: Statistical evidence from payroll records
Piece rates, fixed wages, and incentive effects: Statistical evidence from payroll records
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DOI：
10.1111/1468-2354.00055
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发表时间：
2000-02-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Shearer, B
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paarsch, HJ;Shearer, B
我们开发并估计了一个代理模型下的工人行为计件工资和固定工资。该模型意味着最佳的决策规则，公司的薪酬制度的选择作为工作条件的函数。我们的模型还暗示了激励效应（通过支付工人计件工资而不是固定工资实现的生产率提高）的上限和下限，可以使用回归方法进行估计。使用从不列颠哥伦比亚省一家植树公司的工资记录中收集的每日生产率数据，我们估计这些界限将使生产率提高8.8%和60.4%。结构估计，这说明了公司的薪酬制度的最佳选择，表明激励措施导致生产率提高了22.6%。然而，只有一部分增长代表了有价值的产出，因为工人对激励的反应部分是降低质量。
We develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages. The model implies optimal decision rules for the firm's choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions. Our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect (the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages) that can be estimated using regression methods. Using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm, we estimate these bounds to be an 8.8 and a 60.4 percent increase in productivity. Structural estimation, which accounts for the firm's optimal choice of a compensation system, suggests that incentives caused a 22.6 percent increase in productivity. However, only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives, in part, by reducing quality.