Asymmetric information in health insurance: evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Asymmetric information in health insurance: evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
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DOI：
10.2307/2696362
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发表时间：
2001-09-01
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Hendel, I
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cardon, JH;Hendel, I
逆向选择被认为是保险市场中市场失灵的一个主要原因。关于这一问题的严重程度，几乎没有经验证据。我们估计一个结构模型的健康保险和医疗保健的选择使用的数据从NMES的单个人。逆向选择模型的一个强有力的预测是，风险较高的类型购买更多的保险，平均而言，最终使用更多的护理。我们测试连接健康保险状况和医疗保健消费的不可观察的。我们没有发现信息不对称的证据。
Adverse selection is perceived to be a major source of market failure in insurance markets. There is little empirical evidence on the extent of the problem. We estimate a structural model of health insurance and health care choices using data on single individuals from the NMES. A robust prediction of adverse-selection models is that riskier types buy more coverage and, on average, end up using more care. We test for unobservables linking health insurance status and health care consumption. We find no evidence of informational asymmetries.