Competitive Institution Building: The PT and Participatory Budgeting in Rio Grande do Sul
Competitive Institution Building: The PT and Participatory Budgeting in Rio Grande do Sul
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竞争性制度建设：南里奥格兰德州的 PT 和参与式预算
DOI：
10.1111/j.1548-2456.2006.tb00354.x
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
A. Schneider
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Goldfrank;A. Schneider
摘要 20 世纪 90 年代末，巴西南里奥格兰德州工人党 (PT) 政府引入了参与式预算，即公民在公共集会中确定年度投资优先事项的过程。这一创新是现任政党利用预算机构构建政治冲突的多项尝试之一。参与式预算的特征在其决策过程和政策结果中最为明显。这一过程绕过了反对派占多数的立法领域、劳工党选民基础的参与特权，并触及了反对派的据点。结果有利于贫困和中产阶级选民中潜在支持者的利益。事实证明，这一政治项目很容易受到其自身提高的期望的影响：它未能维持廉洁政府的形象；带来税收增加和财政不安全；并没有达到参与者对定向投资的期望。本文强调了参与式预算，实际上是所有预算，在党派行为者的制度选择中的作用。
Abstract In the late 1990s, the Workers' Party (PT) government of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul introduced participatory budgeting, a process in which citizens establish annual investment priorities in public assemblies. This innovation was one of several attempts by incumbent parties to structure political conflict using budget institutions. The character of participatory budgeting is most evident in its policymaking processes and policy outcomes. The process circumvented legislative arenas where opponents held a majority, privileged participation by the PT's voter base, and reached into opposition strongholds. The outcomes favored the interests of potential supporters among poor and middle-class voters. The political project proved vulnerable to its own raised expectations: it failed to sustain the image of clean government; brought tax increases along with fiscal insecurity; and left unfulfilled the participants' expectations for targeted investments. This article highlights the role of participatory budgeting, indeed all budgeting, in partisan actors' institutional choices.