On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result
On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result
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关于策略证明和本质上单值核心：相反的结果
DOI：
10.1007/s003550200169
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Koji Takamiya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Koji Takamiya
抽象的。在不可分割的良好分配的一般模型中，Sönmez（1999）指出，只要每个偏好配置文件的核心都是非空的，如果分配规则是策略证明的、个体理性的和帕累托最优的，那么该规则是从核心对应中的选择，并且核心对应必须本质上是单值的。本文研究了这一结果的逆命题。我证明，只要偏好域满足一定的“丰富性”条件，如果核心对应关系本质上是单值的，那么从核心对应关系中进行的任何选择都是策略证明的（事实上，甚至是弱联盟策略证明）。特别是，在每个人对自己的任务有严格偏好且不存在消费外部性的偏好领域，这种分配规则是联盟策略证明的。在这个领域，联盟策略证明性相当于马斯金单调性，是实现理论中的一个重要性质。
Abstract. In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result. I demonstrate that whenever the preference domain satisfies a certain condition of `richness', if the core correspondence is essentially single-valued, then any selection from the core correspondence is strategy-proof (even weakly coalition strategy-proof, in fact). In particular, on the domain of preferences in which each individual has strict preferences over his own assignments and there is no consumption externality, such an allocation rule is coalition strategy-proof. And on this domain, coalition strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, an important property in implementation theory.