Cartel Stability in a Delivered Pricing Oligopoly
Cartel Stability in a Delivered Pricing Oligopoly
复制标题
DOI：
10.1007/s00712-005-0150-x
复制
发表时间：
2005-11
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;Noriaki Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;Noriaki Matsushima
利用空间价格歧视框架，研究了企业区位与其合谋能力之间的关系。Gupta和Venkatu(2002)表明，在双寡头模型中，一点集聚是最稳定的位置。我们发现，当有三家公司时，集聚也稳定了卡特尔。然而，当有三家以上的公司时，所有公司的集聚从来都不是最稳定的地点。对于四家公司，以下地点模式产生了最稳定的卡特尔：两家公司在一点，另两家在距离前两家公司最远的地方。
Using the spatial price discrimination framework, the relationship between the locations of firms and their ability to collude is investigated. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) show that in a duopoly model agglomeration at one point is the most stable location. We find that agglomeration stabilizes the cartel when there are three firms, too. When there are more than three firms, however, agglomeration of all firms is never the most stable location. With four firms, the following location pattern produces the most stable cartel: two firms at one point and the other two at the farthest point from the first two.