Efficient Lottery Design
Efficient Lottery Design
复制标题
高效的彩票设计
DOI:
10.1007/s00355-016-0978-8
复制
发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
0.9
通讯作者:
and A. Nesterov
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
O. Kesten;M. Kurino;and A. Nesterov
There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms that have proven to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used in real life for indivisible goods allocation. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.