Distributional Consequences of Political Representation
Distributional Consequences of Political Representation
复制标题
政治代表权的分配后果
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.11.007
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Thomas Stratmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nicola Maaser;Thomas Stratmann
我们从理论和经验两方面考察了代表的地理集中度对财政转移地理分布的影响。我们的理论模型预测，居住在一个地理区域的代表越多，政府对该地区的资金就越多。我们的实证分析使用的事实是，在德国，由于德国׳S在州选举中的选举规则，不同选区的代表人数有所不同。控制各种社会经济、人口和政治变量，并使用各种估计方法，我们发现代表人数较多的选区获得的政府资金较多。
We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the effect of the geographic concentration of representatives on the geographic distribution of fiscal transfers. Our theoretical model predicts that more representatives residing in a geographic area leads to higher government funds to that area. Our empirical analysis uses the fact that in Germany, due to Germany׳s electoral rules in state elections, the number of representatives varies across electoral districts. Controlling for various socio-economic, demographic, and political variables and using a variety of estimation methods, we find that districts with a greater number of representatives receive more government funds.