Defending Home Against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms
Defending Home Against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3799791
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发表时间：
2021-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Kitamura;Noriaki Matsushima;Misato Sato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Kitamura;Noriaki Matsushima;Misato Sato
我们认为排他性合同是本地现有制造商面对跨国制造商进入的生存策略。虽然两家制造商都倾向于与高效的当地分销商进行贸易，但由于进入者的效率，只有进入者才能接受与低效的竞争分销商进行贸易。因此，这种具有竞争力的分销商可能是进入者的外部选择。当进入者变得高效时，外部选择有效地发挥作用，这意味着进入者不会给高效的本地分销商带来很大的好处。因此，当进入者变得高效时，当地制造商更有可能与高效的分销商签订排他性合同。
We consider exclusive contracts as a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, owing to the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient.