An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
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DOI：
10.1257/0002828043052330
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发表时间：
2004-11
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Lawrence M. Ausubel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lawrence M. Ausubel
当投标人表现出多个单位的需求时，标准的拍卖方法通常会产生低效的结果。本文提出了一种新的同质商品的递增竞价拍卖方法，如国库券或电信频谱。拍卖商宣布价格，竞拍者以数量回应。每当物品被“敲定”时，它们都会以当前的价格被授予，并且价格会增加，直到市场出清。这种具有私人价值的(动态)拍卖产生了与(密封出价)维克里拍卖相同的结果，但具有简单和隐私保护的优势。在价值相互依赖的情况下，这种拍卖可能会保持效率，而维克里拍卖则受到普遍的赢家诅咒的影响。
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are "clinched," and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.