General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection
General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection
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DOI：
10.1016/j.physa.2013.03.004
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发表时间：
2013-07
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Takuya Sekiguchi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takuya Sekiguchi
我们研究了有限种群中两人m×m对称和m×n非对称博弈的随机演化博弈动力学，假设一个博弈者基于自己的不满决定改变当前策略，我们称之为自我参照机制.我们导出了弱选择下策略平稳分布的一般表达式，并与Moran过程的平稳分布进行了比较。结果发现，无论是在对称博弈还是在非对称博弈中，对于一个固定的参数集，自我参照机制总是比Moran过程产生更大的优势和劣势策略频率之间的差距。此外，我们发现，对于小的突变率，我们的结果几乎是相同的对应的莫兰过程。
We examine stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of two-player m×m symmetric and m×n asymmetric games in finite populations assuming that a player decides to change her current strategy on the basis of her dissatisfaction, which we call a self-referential mechanism. We derive the general expression for the stationary distribution of strategy under weak selection and compare it with the counterpart of a Moran process. As a result, we find that both in symmetric games and in asymmetric games, the self-referential mechanism always generates a greater gap between the favored and unfavored strategies’ frequencies for a fixed parameter set than does a Moran process. Further, we found that for small mutation rates, our results are almost identical to the counterpart of a Moran process.